Article 35 of the Indian Constitution acts as a bridge between Fundamental Rights (Part III) and the power to legislate upon them. It vests exclusive authority in the Parliament of India to make laws regarding certain specified matters connected with fundamental rights. It also continues the validity of pre-constitution laws until altered or repealed by Parliament. This unique provision ensures uniformity and prevents states from diluting the fundamental rights framework.
The provision was inserted to safeguard the enforcement of fundamental rights against potential state-level inconsistencies. In essence, Article 35 grants Parliament the sole right to enact laws relating to:
📌 Key constitutional insight: Article 35 empowers Parliament, not state legislatures, to prescribe punishment for offenses under Part III. This ensures that fundamental rights remain uniformly enforceable across all states of India.
Article 35 embodies the principle of constitutional centrality. The framers of the Constitution, led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, believed that fundamental rights are so sacrosanct that the power to legislate on their enforcement should not be scattered across state legislatures. This prevents a scenario where a state government passes a law that indirectly infringes upon a fundamental right. The provision also preserves legal continuity — laws that were operational before 1950 continue to apply unless Parliament modifies them.
The power includes prescribing punishment for offences under Article 17 (untouchability), Article 18 (abolition of titles), and any matter pertaining to Article 33 (armed forces) and Article 34 (martial law). Additionally, Parliament can legislate on reservations, and any residual matters related to fundamental rights where the Constitution intends parliamentary action. This exclusive domain ensures that fundamental rights are not subject to varying interpretations by different state governments.
Over the years, the Supreme Court of India has reaffirmed the supremacy of Article 35. In landmark cases such as I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), the Court emphasized that the basic structure doctrine encompasses fundamental rights, and any legislation under Article 35 must not destroy the essence of Part III. Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), the Court underlined that parliamentary legislation on matters listed under Article 35 is exclusive and cannot be encroached upon by states.
Another pivotal observation is that Article 35 works as a check on state legislative competence, reinforcing that India's federal structure has a unitary bias when it comes to fundamental rights enforcement. Courts have consistently held that if a state law trespasses into the domain reserved for Parliament under Article 35, it becomes void ab initio.
| Aspect | Parliament (Under Article 35) | State Legislature |
|---|---|---|
| Legislative authority | Exclusive power to prescribe punishment for offences relating to fundamental rights like untouchability, titles, etc. | Cannot enact laws on matters expressly covered under Article 35 unless delegated. |
| Uniformity | Ensures one national standard for enforcement of fundamental rights. | Could cause disparity if allowed; hence restricted. |
| Reservation & employment | Parliament makes laws for backward classes under Art 16(4). | Only ancillary executive instructions, but not overriding parliamentary framework. |
This division makes the constitutional scheme robust: fundamental rights remain justiciable and uniformly protected against majoritarian whims at state level.
Even after 70+ years, Article 35 remains a cornerstone of India's constitutional democracy. Recent debates on uniform civil code, citizenship laws, and affirmative action highlight how the centralizing force of Article 35 acts as a guardian of fundamental rights. For instance, any legislation that creates new penal consequences regarding discriminatory practices must ideally flow from Parliament. Scholars argue that Article 35 prevents 'patchwork' fundamental rights enforcement across 28 states and 8 union territories. Additionally, with the rise of digital rights and privacy (Article 21), the interpretation of “matters relating to fundamental rights” under Article 35 may expand, further strengthening Parliament's responsibility.
“Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament shall have, and the Legislature of a State shall not have, power to make laws — (a) with respect to any of the matters which under clause (3) of Article 16, clause (3) of Article 32, Article 33 and Article 34 may be provided for by law made by Parliament; and (b) for prescribing punishment for those acts which are declared to be offences under this Part; and Parliament shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Constitution, make laws for prescribing punishment for the offences referred to in sub-clause (ii) of clause (a)...” — The essence ensures that Parliament is the sole authority to legislate on the enforcement of specific fundamental rights and their punishments.
📌 Fun fact: The original Article 35 also had provisions regarding property rights, but the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, omitted certain sections. However, its core exclusive power remains intact and indispensable.
Because the framers intended fundamental rights to have uniform application across India. Allowing states to make such laws would risk inconsistency and could undermine the fundamental rights regime.
Article 35 is a limited exception to the federal principle. It centralizes legislative power only for specified fundamental rights matters—it does not generally affect states' autonomy over other subjects (List II & III).
Key laws include the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (for untouchability), the Parliamentary proceedings related to reservation, and certain provisions of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act that derive authority from Article 33 read with Article 35.
The Supreme Court has held that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. Parliament may prescribe framework legislation, but core policy and punishment for offences relating to fundamental rights must be determined by Parliament itself.